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Abstract 
Market failure is pervasive in the environmental sector, and naturally occurring 
markets are, in many cases, unlikely to produce socially optimal environmental 
outcomes. Despite this, the case for using “market based instruments” has recently 
become popular in the Australian environmental policy debate. The purpose of this 
paper is to survey some of the broad issues that arise in this debate. What do we mean 
by market based instruments, and what is the conceptual foundation for their use? 
What contribution can they make to Australian environmental policy? What needs to 
be done to improve policy development and implementation, in order to use these new 
instruments effectively? 
Introduction 
The term “market based instruments
1” has recently become popular in the Australian 
environmental policy debate. While recognising that market failure is pervasive in the 
environmental sector, so that naturally occurring markets are unlikely to produce 
socially optimal outcomes, the idea is that often “market like” instruments may still 
have a valuable role to play. This thesis is in contrast, on the one hand, to centralised 
regulatory approaches of the “command and control” type, and on the other hand to 
totally decentralised policies that rely on voluntarism and untargeted subsidies. 
Sometimes, paying careful attention to incentives and information constraints, it may 
be possible effectively to decentralise intervention in a way that gains at least some of 
the benefits that are associated with well working markets. If this can be done then 
there may be significant benefits in efficiency, in practical implementability, and in 
the ultimate delivery of environmental outcomes.  
From a more conceptual point of view, the issue at stake is the optimal design of 
institutions in imperfect information environments. Instead of using an “off the shelf” 
policy instrument, one may try to design one that is tailor-made to the problem at 
hand. Sometimes we may end up with something that looks like a standard regulatory 
approach; sometimes it may look quite like a market or an auction; sometimes it may 
look different to either. The outcome, or the form of the instrument, should not be pre-
judged: it should emerge from the actual situation, the policy problem, and the 
analysis. There are new tools in economic theory (mechanism design) and in 
experimental economics that have enhanced our capacity to do this kind of economic 
design. These tools have been used with great success in other parts of the economy 
(see McMillan 2003, Milgrom 2003, Roth 2002). It is now time to find out what they 
can do for the environment. 
                                                 
1 This term is somewhat unfortunate, but it seems to have become embedded in the Australian policy 
debate.   2
The purpose of this paper is to survey some of the broad issues that arise in the debate 
on “market based instruments” and to consider what needs to be done to improve 
policy development and implementation. 
Back to some basic theory 
It is useful, as always, to go back to the fundamental theory of welfare economics and 
market failure. Speaking in broad terms, we know that, in the absence of non-
convexities, if we have a complete set of markets then these markets will deliver a 
Pareto optimal outcome, and that any efficient outcome can be decentralised in this 
way. If we put aside the question of non-convexity (for example natural monopolies) 
then market failure is generically associated with the lack of a full set of markets. For 
example, in the case of Coase’s famous example (Coase 1960) of the smoking factory 
next to the laundry, there is no market for smoke. 
If one asks why such a market might not exist, then the most common answer is 
probably “transaction costs.” However this term is really too vague, and too 
imprecise, to be very useful. One of the lessons that we have learned about transaction 
costs is that it is asymmetric information that is very often the root cause of market 
failure. It is dangerous to do business with somebody if you are at an informational 
disadvantage; special contractual arrangements may be required
2, or in their absence 
markets may not exist at all. To understand such market failure it is necessary to be 
specific. What is the cause: is it information or something else? If it is information, is 
the problem hidden action, hidden knowledge, or some combination of the two? It is 
necessary to be specific, because the policy implications are different. In particular, 
the so-called Coase Theorem need not hold if the transaction costs are due to 
asymmetric information (Farrell 1987, Maileth and Postlewaite 1990). 
Designing policy 
How should we proceed in an environment in which standard market mechanisms will 
not work? To be more specific, how should we proceed if our analysis leads us to 
conclude that an information related market failure is at the heart of the problem? 
The first and most natural observation to make is that the mere recognition that an 
informational defect is at the root of the policy problem may in itself be very useful. 
A direct attack on the information issue may be possible. Policy design, especially in 
the environmental area, is always a multidisciplinary affair. Environmental policy 
problems arise because of the interaction of complex biological systems and complex 
economic systems. Economists, scientists and other professionals must work together 
on such problems. It may be useful for economists to emphasise to scientists that an 
informational problem is at the heart of the policy problem. This insight is not likely 
to be apparent to scientists unless it is pointed out, yet it is the scientists who may be 
able to do something about it. Technological innovations, for example in the areas of 
remote sensing, information processing, and the application of landscape scale 
biophysical models may, if applied creatively, transform the nature of the policy 
problem. At the very least, scientists should be aware of the informational constraints 
to policy and of the value of addressing such constraints in their scientific research 
programs. 
                                                 
2 The principal-agent literature deals with such arrangements.   3
Even if we cannot correct or mitigate the information problem directly, we may 
attempt to design policies that are optimal subject to these informational constraints. 
There is now an enormous literature on how to do this. Recent texts include Laffont 
and Martimort 2002, Milgrom 2003, and Salanie 1997, 2002, and recent survey 
articles include Roth 2002 and McMillan 2003. The key concepts that arise include 
incentive compatibility, the minimisation of information rents, the optimal allocation 
of risk in Principal-Agent problems, credible policy commitment and the 
intertemporal consistency of policy. The typical institutional designs that emerge from 
this approach include auctions of various kinds, market matching algorithms, non-
linear pricing, incentive contracts, menu-based self selection mechanisms, and various 
hybrids of these. Because there is such a rich body of theory behind these methods, 
there is a much richer array of policy instruments to work with than is available under 
traditional command and control approaches. These traditional instruments (quotas, 
taxes, direct regulation, redesign of property rights …) are of course still available to 
the policy maker, and may indeed emerge as the optimal instrument in some cases. 
One of the strengths of the optimal design approach to policy making is that it is 
based on an in-depth, case-by-case study of each policy problem. In this hand-made 
approach to policy design, as opposed to an off-the-shelf approach, there is a greater 
likelihood that there will be a good match between policy and the problem. Another 
of its strengths is that feasible implementation is built in from the beginning as a 
design consideration.  
In practice, policy making is much messier than this. There is rarely a perfect match 
between the policy issue and the textbook model. However, by starting with a rich 
conceptual framework we are in a much better position to find a good practical 
solution. Furthermore, we must be prepared for second best solutions. For example, 
many environmental goods have the nature of public goods, and we know that there 
are no markets to aggregate consumer preferences for these goods. However we do 
have political markets, which may act as a proxy. We know that voting over public 
goods may not be optimal (it reflects the preferences of the median rather than the 
average voter; and once we introduce multiple issues the situation is even less clear), 
but it may be a good start to work with the policy preferences that emerge through 
political institutions and political processes.  
A second example where a partial solution may be worthwhile occurs where market 
failure affects only one side of the market. Consider again the case of a public good. 
Even if there is no effective market to aggregate demand, so that demand must be 
estimated subjectively or through contingent valuation methods, it may still be 
valuable to create mechanisms for efficient supply. The literature on efficient 
procurement is relevant here (see Laffont and Tirole 1993). This ensures at least that 
the good is produced at minimum cost. It also ensures that the cost of the good is 
made explicit, as well as clarifying the implicit tradeoffs that are being made. These 
tradeoffs may usefully be fed back into the decision making process, even if at an 
informal level.  
Finally, while theory provides the starting point for market design, it is by now a well 
established principle that a program of experimental testing is a key step in the 
process from design to implementation.   4
Markets for biodiversity 
As an example of how the modern instruments of market design are being used to 
create new environmental policy instruments, I would like to consider the Bush 
Tender habitat procurement auctions that have been developed and trialled by the 
Victorian Government. I will not discuss these auctions in detail (see Stoneham et al 
2003 for a full account). Rather I will focus on the conceptual framework and how it 
was developed. 
The policy problem to be addressed was how to preserve and manage areas of 
remnant habitat in the Victorian agricultural landscape. These small, widely scattered 
areas have survived the process of wholesale agricultural development largely by 
accident. Because they are the last remnants of what were once widespread ecological 
systems, they are a valuable biodiversity resource. Being on private land, their 
management poses difficult problems.  
Preservation of remnant habitat is to a very large extent a pure public good. It 
enhances the survival probability of species and ecological systems whose existence 
is valued by society. Individual landowners thus have inadequate incentives to protect 
these assets, because of their public good nature, even though to do so provides an 
economically valuable service. Of course some landholders derive private value, some 
of which may be altruistic, from such actions; even so, this value will not include the 
full economic or social value of the public good.  In principle, landowners could 
specialise in managing biodiversity and sell this service, in exactly the same way that 
they produce and sell crops and livestock products. However there is no market for 
biodiversity preservation, and in the absence of such a market these economic gains 
will not be realised. Bush Tender is an attempt to fill this gap. 
There are clear reasons, on both the supply and demand side, why markets for 
biodiversity preservation do not exist
3. On the demand side, the standard arguments 
about free-riding apply, and they are sufficient to show that there will be no effective 
expression of demand. However, as noted above, this does not mean that there is no 
role for policy. In the first place, there are political markets and institutions that act as 
proxy markets in which demand for environmental services may be expressed. These 
markets may be imperfect, but they are a starting point. In the second place, even if 
demand is not expressed perfectly, it is worthwhile to ensure that environmental 
services are provided at minimum cost. This may be achieved if the supply side of the 
market is working properly. 
Bush Tender is concerned almost wholly with this supply side of the market, not with 
demand. We assume that the government demands these goods on the part of the 
public, and we do not inquire whether the level of this demand is or is not optimal. 
The problem is then to ensure the efficient procurement of public goods (Laffont and 
Tirole 1993). In principle, the government announces that it wishes to fund small 
scale localised projects, typically undertaken by a single landowner or by several 
cooperating landowners to protect or rehabilitate an area of remnant habitat. The aim 
of the government is to acquire, at minimum cost, the optimal portfolio of projects. 
                                                 
3 There is some private provision of this public good, and some market activity associated with this 
provision (for example, the purchase of habitat by birding groups). However this does not mean that 
there are properly working markets in which biodiversity preservation receives its true economic value.   5
Information effects stand out as the major impediments to efficient supply of such 
services. Three such effects may be identified.  
In the first place, the value of the services is imperfectly known. Some habitat is 
extremely valuable; some less so, either because it is degraded or because there are 
good substitutes. To a large extent, this ignorance is symmetric. Neither the seller (the 
landholder) nor the buyer (the government) is well informed. On the part of the 
landholder, this is because of a lack of technical knowledge; on the part of the 
government, it is because the information is scattered in many diverse locations. 
Remedying this lack of knowledge is inevitably expensive. Whether it is too 
expensive is ultimately an empirical matter; assessing this is one of the reasons for 
running a series of field trials. The cost of learning the value of these potential 
services that could be purchased depends on the scientific and technical framework 
that is available.  
Good science and good information engineering has been enormously important in 
the Bush Tender project, as has been close teamwork between scientists and 
economists. The main elements of this framework have been as follows. Ecologists 
have created a methodology for assessing and scoring the value of habitat at minimum 
cost. This assessment requires a visit by a trained field officer, so it is expensive. The 
cost can be reduced by targeting effort through the use of landscape databases, remote 
sensing, biophysical models and other ways of making a preliminary low-cost 
assessment, and by an education process that encourages landholders to come forward 
with high value proposals.  
In so far as this is a search process to discover value enhancing trades, both sides of 
the market benefit, and we might hope that neither side should have a major incentive 
to hide or distort information. However there is the potential to run into problems of 
this kind. If a landholder knows or fears that an endangered species will be found on 
their land, then they may worry that the government will expropriate their property, 
either directly or by vigorous enforcement of regulatory frameworks that usually lie 
dormant for lack of information. On the other hand, the government may fear that a 
landholder may hold it hostage, attempting to expropriate the full value of the 
discovery by a threat to destroy it. In this situation the government may be tempted to 
conceal the value of what has been found.  
We encounter here some issues that are pervasive in problems of this kind. The first is 
the question of how the gains from trade are to be shared. At the very least, the 
government must be able to meet a participation constraint. Participants must not be 
made worse off (for example by the risk of expropriation) by participating. This leads 
into the second issue. The government must be able to credibly commit to this 
position. In the process of searching for trades, or later in contracting for the supply of 
services, new information will inevitably come to light. If the government cannot 
commit not to take advantage of this and not to exploit the landholder by 
renegotiating when this new information comes to light, then the initial gains from 
trade may be seriously eroded. Either the landholder may not participate in the first 
place, or may do so only at a very high price. This issue becomes especially important 
when we come to repeated contracts and long term relationships. To some extent 
these problems arise and must be dealt with in the formal structure of the policy 
mechanism. But there is also an important cultural component of trust and respect that 
must not be lost sight of.   6
Once the value of the environmental service becomes apparent, a second information 
problem arises, due to asymmetric information about costs. Some components of the 
cost (for example the value of materials) may be readily apparent, but some 
components (for example the value of the resource in alternative use) will be private 
information. In any bilateral contracting with the government, the landholder has an 
incentive to overstate this private cost. This problem is well understood, at least in 
principle (see for example Laffont and Tirole 1993), and it is known that auctions, of 
one form or another, perform well in this situation. A discriminating price closed bid 
auction (a “Treasury Bill auction”; see Menezes and Monteiro 1995) is used to induce 
competition and honest bidding by landholders. 
A third, quite serious information problem now arises. This is the problem of 
monitoring whether the agreed actions have in fact been carried out. This hidden 
action problem, commonly called “moral hazard” (a term from the insurance 
literature), is also well understood (see Salanie 1997), at least in principle. It can be 
addressed through careful attention to contract design, and through the clever use of 
technology. We know that the optimal contract must focus on the ultimate objective 
(the desired ecological outcome), even though this is difficult to measure, especially 
over the short term. We also know that it must take into account actions that are easier 
to monitor (for example erecting fences), which are connected to the final outcome in 
an indirect or instrumental way. We also know that, in order to provide appropriate 
incentives, the landowner must accept some responsibility for the final outcome, even 
though this outcome is risky and not entirely within his or her control. In practical 
terms, this means that the optimal contract will be balanced between paying for inputs 
and rewarding outputs, and that it will balance the need to provide incentives with the 
need to protect the landholder from carrying too much risk. 
This seems a very difficult, perhaps impossible, task. However good science, and 
creative use of technology, can come to the rescue. Since defective information is the 
source of the contracting problem, a direct attack on the information issue can 
transform the contracting problem into one that is more tractable. The approach that is 
being explored is to provide landholders with digital cameras and to write into the 
contract a schedule of photo-points and photo dates, to create an effective monitoring 
regime. Files can be downloaded in digital form for evaluation and record keeping. 
This regime can be backed up through remote sensing technology and random site 
visits. While technology cannot provide complete information, it can greatly reduce 
the informational transaction costs and make feasible a richer array of contracting 
possibilities. One can go further. By photographing both treatment sites and control 
sites, it is possible to measure not only whether simple actions (say the erection of a 
fence) have taken place, but also to assess ecological outcomes (for example changes 
to vegetation cover relative to a control site). It may be possible to train landholders to 
perform more complex measuring tasks. This approach makes it feasible to reward 
outcomes as well as inputs. The proper use of control sites also allows one to 
compensate, to some degree, for seasonal effects, and thus to reduce the risk imposed 
on the landholder. 
Stepping back from the formal analysis of auction design and contract theory, a very 
important part of this project is to transform the role of landholders from passive to 
active. Once a market of some sort is created, landholders can produce biodiversity 
services in the same way that they produce other commodities. They should be able to 
bring all their skills and intimate local knowledge to this task, once they learn how to 
do it. Centralised command and control cannot hope to achieve this.   7
Experience in the field (see Stoneham et al 2003) has confirmed that this approach 
seems to be workable. There is some evidence that the cost of procurement under this 
approach is very favourable in comparison to alternatives. There is also evidence that 
both field officers and landholders believe that it is working well. There are also 
benefits of a wider kind. The bidding schedule provides good information on the 
supply curve for these environmental services. With only an imperfect estimate of 
demand we cannot say with confidence that the equilibrium price in this market 
represents the marginal social value of these services (though it is arguably the best 
estimate available). However it does provide a good indication of the tradeoffs 
between various policies affecting some types of biodiversity preservation or 
destruction. For example it provides a shadow price for evaluating the cost of similar 
habitat destruction in activities such as forestry. It also provides a price signal to non-
participating landholders of the true economic value of habitat and other resources for 
biodiversity preservation. 
The Murray-Darling Basin 
As a second example of the role for “market based instruments” in environmental 
policy it is interesting to consider the case of the Murray-Darling. The riverine 
systems of the Murray-Darling Basin are one of Australia’s great economic and 
environmental resources yet one of the most degraded and at risk. It has been recently 
asked what role market based instruments might play in the management of these 
rivers. More generally, what is the place for formal economic design in the 
management of this highly complex system?  
It is interesting to consider, at least in outline, some of the broad parameters of the 
problem
4. In a full analysis it would of course be important to start with a detailed 
understanding of historical relations and existing institutions before recommending 
how one might move towards an optimal set of arrangements – there is no attempt to 
do this here. But it is also quite informative to consider the issues from first 
principles, especially as some of the issues are different from those discussed above in 
relation to the Bush Tender project. 
In discussing Bush Tender, we started with the demand side. We observed that 
although we are dealing with a public good, there are proxy political markets which 
give a measure, although imperfect, of demand. In the case of the Murray-Darling, the 
situation is much more complicated. From an economic decision making point of 
view, one of the most striking characteristics of the Murray-Darling problem is that it 
is an inter-jurisdictional one. Several state governments are involved, as well as the 
federal government. While there is undoubtedly a great deal of common ground in the 
objectives of these bodies, there is also scope for disagreement. Any institution
5 
through which these bodies interact, either cooperatively or in rivalry, defines the 
rules of a game. Game theoretic tools and concepts can be used to analyse and 
evaluate the performance of such an institution from an economic perspective. 
Furthermore it is possible, using techniques from game theory and experimental 
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Mark Eigenraam for some of the ideas in this section. See Eigenraam 1999, 
Eigenraam et al 2003. 
5 For example, the Murray Darling Basin Commission.   8
economics, to attempt to design optimal institutions
6. Any “Market Based Instrument” 
approach to the management of the Murray Darling Basin should ideally start at this 
level. Reform at this level may be difficult or impossible, but it is necessary to 
understand the constraints under which one operates. 
Still considering the demand side, we observe that we are dealing with a very 
complicated system, with complex externalities and interactions involving water, salt, 
river flow, and groundwater. These interactions involve biological, physical and 
economic systems. Even a superficial consideration of the complexity of the system 
suggests that a centralised command and control approach will probably achieve only 
a limited amount. It is important to note the water (and salt) are not ends in 
themselves. What matters are economically relevant outcomes. In particular, we are 
concerned with environmental outcomes. These outcomes may be to some extent 
localised (for example by their upstream or downstream location), and they are likely 
to be influenced in specific and nonlinear ways by river management (for example, by 
floods).  
All this suggests that if “market based instruments” are to play an effective role then 
decentralised, active environmental managers will be required, with the power to 
trade actively in salt and water markets. The role of these managers is to express 
demand for environmental outcomes at a local level. These agents will need to have 
incentives that are closely aligned with those of the global river manager. In order to 
align incentives, information is extremely important. So once again we return to the 
importance of measurement, evaluation, monitoring, and the interpretation of 
outcomes through scientifically valid frameworks. The scientific infrastructure is in 
fact crucial. One way to think of this approach is that we would be bringing into the 
market artificial agents with specially designed environmental property rights to trade 
on behalf of the environment. The precise rules and incentive structures under which 
such a group of environmental managers might operate is again a question that can be 
addressed through the tools of market design and experimental economics. 
The supply side is to some extent more straight-forward than in the Bush Tender 
example. In so far as the problem is one of river management, trading in water, river 
flows, and salt is likely to be the main mechanism to achieve environmental 
outcomes
7. Thus the effective use of “market based instruments” depends on well 
working markets for water and salt. Existing water markets are imperfect and salt 
markets rudimentary. There may be very considerable environmental benefits from 
reform of these existing markets, provided that it is accompanied by the creation of 
agents who can trade on behalf of the environment.  
The main role for economic design in managing this river system would seem to be in 
specifying the nature of the environmental managers who would trade on behalf of the 
environment. This means specifying the incentives of these agents (a problem in 
contract design), and the environment in which they operate (a problem in market 
design). 
                                                 
6 There is an enormous literature on mechanism design, which deals precisely with problems of this 
kind. For a survey of such institutional evaluation and design from the perspective of “the Economist as 
Engineer,” see Roth 2002. 
7 It may also be desirable to engage in other activities, such as engineering works.   9
What we need to do 
Returning again to the basic principles of welfare economics, the standard recipe 
applies. The first step in the economic policy process is to analyse what is going on. 
Who are the agents? What are their decision variables? How much do they know, how 
much can they observe? What are their incentives? 
The second step is diagnosis. Is there a market failure, or is the outcome optimal? If 
there is a market failure, what is its source? The fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics provide the basis for this diagnosis.  
The third step is to find a remedy that addresses the source of the market failure.  
So far, the process is classical, and it may be found in any text on public economics. 
The “market based instruments” or economic design approach suggests that, in 
searching for a remedy, we should not just take existing markets and institutions as 
we find them. By careful design we may be able to modify these institutions, or to 
create new markets and institutions, in such a way that we remedy some or all of the 
market failure. I would suggest that the Bush Tender habitat procurement auctions 
have attracted attention not so much for the particular application, but because they 
demonstrates a new approach to policy development with much wider scope for 
application.  
Theory provides an indispensable road into this market design process. It provides the 
appropriate concepts, directs attention to the important issues, and it gives some 
general outline of what the optimal solution would look like. However it cannot 
provide a stand alone solution. A great deal of expert judgement is called for, and 
there is an equally indispensable role for experiments and pilot schemes. 
It is very important that policy makers appreciate that market design is a process, and 
not be mislead by identifying it with the outcome in any particular case. Let us take 
for example the Bush Tender project, which has lead to something of a fashion for 
auctions. It is an error, but unfortunately one that can be made by unsophisticated 
policy makers without the appropriate conceptual background, to assume that the use 
of “market based instruments” just means the use of auctions. In the case of Bush 
Tender, an auction is indeed a key part of the policy package. However it is just one 
part – contract design and the integration of economic design with biophysical 
modelling are equally important – and it is a particular kind of auction, implemented 
in a particular way. In the case of the Murray-Darling Basin, which we also 
considered above, auctions may not play such a central role. Copying an auction 
without understanding the reasons for it, or the way that it is integrated with other 
instruments, can only lead to disappointment and bad policy. See Klemperer 2002a,b 
for some truly spectacular examples of policy disasters of this kind. Unfortunately, 
bad outcomes due to bad design can discredit the use of new instruments and new 
approaches. This would be unfortunate, since these new ideas may allow us to deliver 
much better environmental and economic outcomes.  
Economists are well placed to explain to policy makers the nature of good policy, and 
to damp down unrealistic expectations. In particular, it is unrealistic to expect that 
new instruments can be developed and implemented very quickly, especially in such a 
complex area as environmental policy.  
What then are the prerequisites for the application of economic design principles in 
environmental policy? The first is good theory. The toolkit of the traditionally trained 
agricultural economist or environmental economist probably needs to be updated. We   10
need people with training not just in price theory and classical welfare economics, but 
also in information economics, game theory, mechanism design, experimental 
economics and economic design. Meeting this need is an issue that should be 
addressed at the education and recruitment level. So far as I am aware, no Australian 
University offers a subject in Economic Design. It should also be addressed at the 
policy formation level. Policy makers should be aware that they may need to go 
beyond their traditional sources of advice.  
The second prerequisite is good experimental economics, which goes hand in glove 
with good theory. Virtually the same remarks apply. In particular, so far as I am 
aware, no Australian University offers a subject in Experimental Economics. 
The third prerequisite, which is clear on both theoretical grounds and in experience, is 
that there needs to be a close partnership between economists and environmental 
scientists. The ecological systems that we deal with are complex, and require 
sophisticated understanding and management. The economic systems are equally 
complex, especially with respect to decentralised decision making, incentives and 
information constraints. Economic design in the environmental area requires an 
integration of expertise in both areas. 
The final prerequisite, which is perhaps implicit in the first three, is meticulous 
attention to detail. Given these prerequisites, “market based instruments” as 
implemented through a disciplined process of economic design, have an important 
role to play in environmental policy. 
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